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Can We Predict the Likelihood of Financial Distress in Companies from their Corporate 
Governance and Borrowing? 
Abstract 
Purpose – A primary aim of the study is to investigate the impact of corporate governance 
structures on the likelihood of financial distress in U.K. listed companies. The paper examines the 
impact of borrowing and corporate governance structures on financial distress likelihood in U.K. 
companies.  
Design/methodology/approach – The study uses a quantitative approach with financial, 
governance and borrowing measures and data from 270 firm-observations between 2010 and 2018. 
The study analyses the impact of borrowing and corporate governance structures to indicate 
financial distress likelihood in British companies. Corporate governance variables such as 
ownership concentration, independence indicators, CEO duality, director remuneration and 
corporate loans are considered, as well as the UK Corporate Governance Code.  
Findings – The results indicate that companies with low ownership concentration, and low degree 
of independence are more likely to incur financial distress. Larger boards and better director 
remuneration can reduce financial distress likelihood and the existence of corporate loans can 
increase this likelihood. Empirical consideration of corporate borrowing is a new contribution to 
the literature.  
Originality – Variables are highlighted and aggregated that have not otherwise been studied 
together; the UK Corporate Governance Code’s main ideas are empirically supported; the study is 
useful for defining corporate governance structure strategies. 
 












Financial distress and bankruptcy impact on companies and the business world every day (Altman, 
1968; Pindado et al, 2008; Manzaneque et al, 2016). Studying contributing factors to that 
phenomenon is essential, Furthermore, understanding how corporate governance affects financial 
distress should be a central tool, allowing better structures, more efficient operations, improving 
information transparency, safeguarding stakeholders, and helping mitigate risks.  
Corporate borrowing and governance characteristics are enormously important in studying 
company financial distress likelihood. The influence of corporate governance structures on 
financial distress likelihood is studied, alongside the variables apparently affecting this likelihood.  
The relationship of corporate governance structures and borrowing with financial distress 
likelihood in UK listed companies is a central question explored, applying a model with mainly 
corporate governance variables, to identify structures that may increase financial distress 
likelihood. 
The UK Corporate Governance Code will additionally be considered. It concerns responsibilities 
of shareholders and directors and remuneration and independence of the latter (FRC, 2019)1. 
Financial ratios are one of the most critical factors in predicting financial distress and firm 
performance (Manzaneque et al, 2016; Chen, 2008; Altman, 1968; Pindado et al, 2008). The 
study’s financial distress model covers the main financial ratios of Pindado et al (2008), Altman 
(1968) and Ohlson (1980), alongside empirical studies of corporate governance predicting 
financial distress. Variables such as ownership concentration, shareholder independence, board 
size, CEO duality, director remuneration and corporate loans are considered, with their connection 
to agency theory, which will also be considered.  
Financial and corporate governance data from 270 UK listed companies across nine years (2010 - 
2018) is examined with half the companies exhibiting financial distress and half being healthy. 
Evaluating the relationship between financial distress and corporate governance, including 
variables denoting other characteristics apparently not analysed to date, contributes to the existing 
literature. Corporate loans, director remuneration, and shareholder independence are focused on, 
complementing these with a study, and hence support, of the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
A main contribution is to present variables indicating strong corporate governance structures, 
providing a guide to avoid financial problems of corrupt and weak company management with 
 
1) The Financial Reporting Council (FRC), regulating accountants, auditors, actuaries and setting the UK’s 
Corporate Governance and Stewardship Codes, is an independent regulator in the U.K. and Ireland. 
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poor corporate governance; exploring U.K. market characteristics further and deepening our 
understanding of how U.K. companies can increase the effectiveness of their corporate governance 
and reduce bankruptcy likelihood. There is a lack of studies with empirical evidence of the U.K. 
market with a direct approach to the U.K. Corporate Governance Code. 
We will show that ownership concentration, board size, independence of shareholders and level of 
director remuneration are highly significant but negatively related with U.K. company financial 
distress likelihood. In contrast, corporate loans appear closely linked to financial distress: 
companies with corporate loans appear more likely to incur financial distress.  
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Corporate Governance, Financial Distress, and their relationship 
Company performance has a direct relationship with corporate governance and how companies 
are managed (Yu, 2011; Hodgson et al, 2011). Corporate governance is ‘the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled’ (Financial Reporting Council) in which managers and 
directors of companies (Handley-Schachler et al, 2007) mainly implement that system.  
Financial distress is associated with at least a company’s incapacity to pay obligations or debt 
when due (Geng et al, 2015); financial debt is the main cause of financial distress or default for 
Pham Vo Ninh et al (2018). 
Models have been created to predict financial distress (Altman, 1968; Pindado et al, 2008; Daily, 
1996; Khoja et al, 2019; Kahl, 2002). They are useful to anticipate and understand companies’ 
financial signals before a collapse or a recession period; so companies, investors, creditors, 
regulators and stakeholders can better understand how to avoid a bankruptcy situation through 
application of important strategies and good management actions. 
The relationship between financial distress and governance has been investigated in prior studies 
(Manzaneque, 2016; Darrat et al, 2016; Daily, 1996; Siddiqui, 2015; Opler et al, 1994), the 
consensus being that financial distress may occur when shareholders, directors or CEOs make 
decisions more in favour of themselves than the company. In short, corporate governance 
structures and characteristics can have a strong influence on company performance and can prompt 




2.1.1 Agency problems 
The question of agency theory in a corporate governance context has been explored (Berle and 
Means, 1932; Eisenhardt, 1989; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Hong, 2019). It potentially happens 
when shareholders and directors choose strategies mainly or only benefitting themselves. 
Companies have collapsed due to agency problems, or through corporate governance structure 
complications; with weaknesses of corporate governance and conflicts of interest leading to 
financial distress; in turn, inducing company collapses, destroying stakeholders and significantly 
(Davis, 1993; Dibra, 2016). Examples of weak corporate governance inducing large collapses are 
Enron, WorldCom, Sunbeam, Tyco, and Xerox. Aspects of corporate governance and board 
strategy failed in Enron (Gillan and Martin, 2007). A conflict of interest between board members 
led to manipulation of asset values, prices and financial positions.  
Agency theory helps us understand how problems with corporate governance directly impacts 
financial distress likelihood. Companies can easily fall into agency problems, prejudicing their 
financial system, without a well-structured board; with even money laundering, bribery, tax 
evasion or other financial frauds occurring. Bad management and corporate governance 
deficiencies can have global implications for stakeholders. 
 
2.1.2 UK Corporate Governance Code 
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) is the entity responsible for U.K. corporate governance 
regulations and the UK Corporate Governance Code represents the main guidance code; aiming to 
respond to challenges brought about by corporate governance weaknesses revealed in huge firm 
collapses around the world. (FRC, 2019). 
The Code’s basic principles concern Board members’ responsibilities and independence, intending 
to stimulate boards to think how their roles should be exercised effectively in favour of their 
companies. Strong corporate governance is based on values of independence, responsibility, 
transparency, and effective monitoring; values intended to support long-term sustainability and 
success in companies and protect stakeholders, avoiding agency problems. 
 
2.2 Corporate Governance Variables as Financial Distress Measure(s) 
2.2.1 Ownership Concentration 
How is ownership concentration, either dispersed (with minority shareholders) or concentrated 
(with large and controlling shareholders), linked with financial distress? Claessens et al (2002) 
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and Alhares (2020) believe there is a negative relationship between ownership concentration and 
financial distress. Large shareholders are highly interested in the company’s welfare: ‘…incentive 
to have the firm run properly, because…(doing so) would raise his wealth; likewise, his incentive 
to reduce the value of the firm by extracting private benefits is weaker, because doing so would 
lower his wealth’ (Claessens et al, 2002, p. 2754). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) agree large 
shareholders are strongly motivated to monitor the firm effectively. Consequently, it is believed 
large shareholders positively influence company management, improving performance, and 
mitigating agency problems or conflicts of interest. 
 
2.2.2 Independence of Company’s Shareholders and Directors 
A company may have a high degree of independence if it shows a particular percentage of 
shareholder ownership. The bulk of the literature supports the need for an independent company 
with independent shareholders and directors facilitating proper management of the business. 
Following agency theory, board independence is crucial to ensure a company’s requirements are 
respected, without selfish or exploitative behaviour occurring. Independent directors reinforce 
Boards, bringing further knowledge and additional outside influence (Kesner et al, 1986); an 
independent structure better supports the interests of shareholders. 
Independence allows a diversity of information and can contribute to decreasing agency problems 
(Daily and Dalton, 1994a). The UK Corporate Governance Code indicates companies should 
remain independent with a board mostly consisting of independent, non-executive members (FRC, 
2019). 
 
2.2.3 Board Size 
Board size is considered significant and essential in determining management quality and company 
performance. A large board size benefits company performance (Fox, 1998); suggesting that firms 
with small boards are more likely to incur financial distress due to their incapacity to collect 
necessary resources to guarantee their survival. Darrat et al (2016) associate large boards with an 
improvement in companies’ operating performance, with that association being stronger in large 
and complex firms. Large boards can provide an overall knowledge increase for the company, 
allowing a variety of perspectives, possibly contributing to a reduction in financial distress 
likelihood (Pfeffer, 1973).  
Boards of Directors are responsible for taking decisions influencing companies’ financial health. 
Their power to delegate, hire and fire executives, accept loans, and define dividend and options 
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policies financially affect companies. Agency theory explains how companies under financial 
distress can decline when boards display conflict or take unreasonable decisions.   
 
2.2.4 CEO Duality  
With CEO duality, company chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) roles are not separated: 
the same person occupies both positions. The literature is controversial:  
Agency theory recommends separate chair and CEO roles because duality could lead to self-
serving behaviour, occasioning a cost for the firm’s owners (Daily and Dalton, 1994b).   
Stewardship theory argues the CEO/Chair intends to do a good job and be recognized as a good 
steward of company value; the company benefits from a strong command, leadership is simplified, 
and shareholders returns improve with CEO duality (Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  
The UK Corporate Governance Code believes the chair and chief executive officer roles should 
be exercised by different people, aiming to maintain board independence (FRC, 2019). 
 
2.2.5 Directors’ Remuneration 
For Lee (2009), company performance increases with performance-related payment(s) to directors; 
contracts lacking financial incentives to the CEO characterised companies with poor performance.  
 Perry and Zenner (2001) suggest a positive impact between overall pay and director performance, 
and these contracts appear to be increasing, apparently achieving better results for companies. 
Director remuneration should reflect shareholder wealth and firm performance (Monem and Ng, 
2013). Directors and managers have therefore an interest in maintaining shareholder wealth: an 
increase in managerial effort it is believed results from linking shareholder and director wealth 
with company performance. 
Agency theory believes remuneration creates director incentive to perform well, positing that 
compensation contracts and high payment to directors may reduce agency costs (Conyon and He, 
2011). The UK Corporate Governance Code believes a director should not be involved in decisions 
related to their own remuneration, but rewards should be aligned with the financial capacity and 
company performance (FRC, 2019).  
It is believed directors need high remuneration and high recognition when managing companies; 
it is an immense responsibility and directors will perform well if they feel their efforts will be 
compensated in line with company results. The negative relationship between director 




2.2.6 Corporate Loans  
Loans are important for corporate financing, allowing companies to increase their liquidity in a 
short time (McKeon, 1969). Firms’ capital structures include debts and loans, increasing their 
investment or cash. Companies can reduce the costs of increasing equity through shareholder funds 
(DeAngelo et al, 2011). Loans and debt have clear advantages, but the cost should not be 
overlooked. Borrowing costs can be high. Low management effectiveness with external factors 
and a high cost of debt can bring firms into financial distress. This paper explores how loans are 
linked with financial distress.  
Parlour and Winton (2013) consider a situation where possession of a loan results in company 
default. A high number of covenants give the bank the advantage when a company violates some 
of the clauses. Banks take opportunity of the advantage, increasing interest rates and decreasing 
the quality of the borrower’s loan. Rajan et al (2015) empirically demonstrate that an interest rate 
increase on a company’s loans is a default predictor. Hence, companies should undertake 
appropriate management control to avoid contract violations or situations putting them at risk of 
default. Demiroglu and James (2015) found a positive relationship between loans (with collateral 
obligations) and predisposition to bankruptcy.  
 
2.3 Other Control Variables: Financial Ratios and Company Age 
Corporate governance’s position in financial distress will be explored, but a look at financial theory 
to predict financial distress is crucial (Pindado et al, 2008). This study’s regression is supported 
by financial ratios based on the Pindado model: Financial Expenses and Retained Earnings. 
Financial Expenses (FEt/RTAt-1) is the explanatory variable associated with the financial expenses 
a company needs to cover. Retained Earnings (REt-1/RTAt-1) is the explanatory variable associated 
with a firm’s earnings or losses during its life.  
Company Age is a control variable. Altman (1968) showed that young firms have a higher chance 
of being classified as financially distressed. Due to their limited years of life, they do not have the 
opportunity to accumulate profit over time.  
 
2.4 Hypothesis  
The previous section’s variables will be tested to determine association with financial distress, and 
utilised in the next section through a binominal logistic regression to test the following hypotheses:  
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H1: Ownership concentration and company independence are negatively related to financial 
distress. 
H2: A large board size is negatively related to financial distress 
H3: Director remuneration is negatively related to financial distress 
H4: Corporate loans are positively related to financial distress. 
H5: CEO Duality is positively related to financial distress. 
 
3. Framework and Model Development 
This paper emphasises financial and corporate governance components, therefore the Pindado et 
al (2008) and Manzaneque et al (2016) models were followed to ascertain how corporate 
governance influences financial distress likelihood. Based on these models, a framework was 
constructed, including certain variables, resulting in: 
FD = β0 + β1 FE + β2 RE + β3 OWNERSt + β4 INDt + β5 BS + β6 CEOD+ dt + 
ni + uit             (1) 
Where: FD represents Financial Distress; FE is the ratio FEit/RTAit-1; RE is the ratio REit-1/RTAit-
1; OWNERS is the percentage of Ownership Concentration (total of shares owned by large 
shareholders); IND represents the level of Shareholder Independence (based on the BvD 
Independence Indicator)2; BS is Board Size (number of Board members); CEOD represents CEO 
Duality3. Table 2 presents a detailed description.  
According to the models from Perry and Zenner (2001) and Lee (2009), executive remuneration 
is valuable to measure company performance. Expecting higher director remuneration to reduce 
financial distress likelihood, the variable ‘DR’, representing Directors’ Remuneration, was 
introduced into the model. 
Complementing the model, a regression was performed examining how corporate loans can be 
associated with the probability of financial distress occurring; hence the variable ‘CL’, Corporate 
Loans, was introduced into the model.  
Resulting in the final model: 
 
2 BvD Independence Indicator: indicator created by Bureau van Dijk to characterise degree of a 
company’s independence relating to its shareholders. 
3 CEO Duality: dummy variable taking value 1 when chairman and CEO positions are exercised by same 
person and 0 otherwise. 
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FD = β0 + β1 FE + β2 RE + β3 AGE + β4 OWNERS + β5 IND + β6 BS + β7 CEOD + 
β8 DR + β9 CL + dt + ni + uit       (2) 
 
Table 2 describes the explanatory variables: dt, ni and uit represent time effect, individual effect, 
and random disturbance, respectively. Coefficients of the equation are given by Betas: β0 
representing the constant of the model, and the remaining Betas representing the explanatory 
variables’ behaviour. 
The final equation (2) incorporates two approaches: firstly, incorporating financial ratios to 
measure financial distress likelihood, providing an overview of how a company is performing 
financially; secondly, incorporating corporate governance variables proven to be associated with 
companies’ financial performance. A binomial logistic is used in the final econometric model, 
since the dependent variable (financial distress) is binary; assuming the value 0 when the company 
is not considered in financial distress and 1 when the company is in financial distress. 
 
4. Data and Sample Selection 
A quantitative approach is used to analyse the impact of corporate governance structures on 
financial distress likelihood in British companies. The Fame database was used to collect all 
financial and corporate governance data. 
A sample of 270 U.K. listed companies was used for nine years from 2010 to 2018. From 1,992 
companies’ data, financial services companies were excluded from the sample: they can present 
features potentially compromising the study’s essence; high levels of leverage, for example, not 
usually present in non-financial companies (Fama and French, 1992).  
All inactive companies were excluded, companies not including their latest available accounts data 
in 2018, alongside companies with missing data between 2010 to 2018. Table 1 displays the sample 
selection process. Companies were matched by total average assets and classified as financially 
distressed or non-distressed; distressed when they had at least one year of distress in the period 
under consideration. In this sense, therefore, the sample was performed based on a one-year firm-
observation. Following Pindado et al (2008), the companies were deemed distressed when they 
met one of the following: their EBITDA was lower than their financial expenses for two 
consecutive years; or a fall in their market value occurred between two consecutive periods.  
 




The final sample had 270 firm-observations, including 135 financially distressed and 135 non-
distressed firms. Companies were chosen by the criteria of highest total average assets. 
Table 2 presents variable descriptions and definitions for analysis of this sample, analysing a 
sample of 30 companies in each year, totalling 270 firm-observations. The study uses a cross-
sectional logistic regression to analyse the different companies in the different years, with 50 per 
cent of the companies considered financial distressed and 50 per cent considered not distressed.  
 
Insert Table 2 
 
Table 3 shows the sample distribution per industry, using the Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC Code) and excluding financial services companies. More predominant industries were mining 
and quarrying, manufacturing, and professional and scientific and technical activities, although the 
sample contains companies from all industries. 
 
Insert Table 3 
 
Descriptive statistics and Correlation 
Table 4 shows that the variables’ descriptive statistics are consistent with past research. Reviewing 
Board Size and Ownership Concentration, they are consistent with Elmagrhi et al (2017). It is 
expected that U.K. companies have on average approximately eight Board members and reveal a 
relatively low concentration of ownership. This is confirmed by the present study with average 
ownership concentration being 29 per cent. Considering the BvD Independence indicator, U.K. 
companies are evidently mainly independent – encouraging, considering the UK corporate 
governance recommendation of independent boards. Remuneration also needs to be fair, according 
to the FRC (2019), and U.K. directors on average have a remuneration of 2 million pounds. 
Table 4.1 presents the categorical variables’ descriptive statistics: most U.K. companies had a 
corporate loan in the analysis period – expected, since loans are a direct way of obtaining 
financing; most U.K. companies do not have CEO duality, consistent with Guest (2008). 
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics by group (distressed and non-distressed companies). 
Fig.1 shows the financial expenses for non-distressed and distressed firms during 2010 to 2018. 
As expected, financially distressed companies present higher financial expenses and lower retained 
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earnings. Except for 2011, with the largest negative retained earnings, non-distressed firms’ 
financial expenses are lower than distressed firms for the remaining years.  
 
Insert Table 4 and Table 4.1 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show the Financial Expenses and Retained Earnings for non-distressed and 
distressed firms for 2010 to 2018. The results indicate that companies in difficulties have lower or 
negative retained earnings resulting from a succession of losses for the sample period, 2010 to 
2018. 
 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 
 
In analysing corporate governance variables, there is a noticeable difference between distressed 
and non-distressed company characteristics. For example, with Ownership concentration and BvD 
independence, distressed companies show lower ownership and independence, consistent with 
Claessens et al (2002) and Kesner et al (1986). Darrat et al (2016) concluded that companies 
perform better with a larger board. This is confirmed, since non-distressed companies have a larger 
board size with approximately eight members. With director remuneration, there is a high 
discrepancy between the two groups: distressed companies offered directors a lower remuneration 
(0.9 million pounds on average) than non-distressed companies (3.172 million on average). Table 
5 also presents the t-test and concludes there is a significance of the means for the financial 
expenses, retained earnings, age, independence indicator and director remuneration variables. 
For the categorical variables, CEO duality and corporate loans, a chi-square test was performed to 
check the association with the financial distress variable (composed of two groups: distressed and 
non-distressed companies). Table 5.1 presents this test’s results, and concludes there is a 
significant association with the corporate loans variable; the result of Pearson Chi-square was 
15.28 per cent. 
 
Insert Table 5 and Table 5.1 
 
Table 6 shows the variables’ correlations, through both Pearson and Spearman correlation 
coefficients and significance levels. As expected a priori, most corporate governance variables are 
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significantly correlated with the financial distress variable. For example, there is an evident 
relationship between financial distress and BvD independence, board size, director remuneration 
and corporate loans. This conclusion is in line with previous research (Kesner et al, 1986; Darrat 
et al, 2016; Lee, 2009; and Demiroglu; James, 2015). 
 
Insert Table 6 
 
5. Regression Results and Findings 
This study performs a binary logistic regression, taking a cross sectional dimension. In the model 
used, the dependent variable is a discrete binary (coded as 1 when companies are considered 
financially distressed and 0 otherwise), and the independent variables are continuous and discrete. 
Table 7 presents the results of the test performed after verifying the assumptions. The model 
appears statistically significant; the Chi-square from the Omnibus test is 214.24 per cent and the 
correspondent p-value is less than 0.001.  
 
Insert Table 7 
 
Table 7 shows the logistic regression’s summary results. The model aims to measure the impact 
of financial and corporate governance variables on financial distress likelihood. The model’s 
results show that the variables of financial expenses, retained earnings, age, ownership 
concentration, independence indicator, board size, director remuneration, and corporate loans are 
significant when analysing UK companies’ financial distress likelihood. However, CEO duality 
does not appear to have a high significance. 
Considering the model’s two financial ratios, the results are consistent with the literature (Altman, 
1968; Pindado et al, 2008). As in the empirical studies of Pindado et al (2008) and Manzaneque 
et al (2016), financial expense is significant, having a positive relationship with financial distress 
likelihood. In the present model, it has a positive coefficient and is significant at the 1 per cent 
level (p=0.002). 
Retained earnings has a high significance; its p-value is significant at the 1 per cent level (p<0.001). 
Retained earnings is a ratio, part of profitability analysis over time. Companies with negative 
retained earnings are more likely to incur financial distress – consistent with Pindado et al (2008) 
who argued that companies’ future capacity for self-financing may be affected by low or negative 
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past profitability. Due to problems in self-financing, companies can quickly suffer financial 
distress or bankruptcy. In analysis of the retained earnings/total assets ratio, Altman (1968) adds 
that young firms have a higher chance of being classified as financially distressed. Due to their 
limited years of life, they do not have as much opportunity to accumulate profit over time, so there 
is a higher incidence of bankruptcy (Altman, 1968). The regression results confirm that company 
age impacts on financial distress likelihood; this variable has a negative coefficient, and is 
significant at the 10 per cent level (p=0.096). 
The second part of the model shows reliable results, considering prior literature, demonstrating 
that Hypothesis 1 is supported: ownership concentration and company independence are 
negatively aligned with financial distress. Ownership concentration is significant at the 1 per cent 
level (p=0.004) and presents a negative coefficient, consistent with Claessens et al (2002) and 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986). It is widely believed large shareholders have a higher capacity for 
effective business monitoring. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), large shareholders have 
a higher interest in the business performing well and therefore avoid agency problems and conflicts 
of interest. Company independence, referring to shareholder independence, presents a similar 
result. The BvD independence indicator is significant at the 5 per cent level (p=0.013) and presents 
a negative coefficient. We can conclude that the independence level is aligned with better 
performance as agency problems may be mitigated. As supported by Kesner et al (1986), 
independent directors reinforce the board with knowledge and outside influence. The UK 
Corporate Governance Code demonstrates a similar view in supporting independent boards. 
With the board size variable, Hypothesis 2 is confirmed: firms with large boards are less likely to 
incur financial distress. Board Size presents a negative coefficient with a significance at the 5 per 
cent level (p=0.047), indicating that firms with more members on the board might have a better 
financial performance. This is consistent with Darrat et al (2016) who associated large boards with 
an improvement in company operating performance. Fox (1998) and Pfeffer (1973) further support 
the result: with large boards, there is more capacity to collect necessary resources to help company 
performance. Additional board members can lead to more shared knowledge which contributes to 
better overall performance and reduces financial distress likelihood. In Manzaneque’s (2016), 
empirical study, there is evidence of a negative relationship between board size and distress 
likelihood, concluding that companies with a higher number of board members have additional 
access to information and resources and are better able to control management. Moreover, a high 
number of board members supports a diversity of interests and viewpoints that, in the end, 
contributes to increased financial performance and reduces financial distress likelihood.  
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With director remuneration, lower remuneration is evidently linked with the occurrence of 
financial distress, being significant at the 1 per cent level (p=0.001) with a negative coefficient. 
This supports previous theories believing higher remuneration generates higher motivation and 
increases company performance (Conyon and He, 2011). According to their research, company 
performance is strongly linked with compensation contracts of directors; and strong contracts 
contribute to relieving agency problems within the board. Hypothesis 3 is supported and sustained 
in part by the UK Corporate Governance Code stating the importance of having fair remuneration 
rewarding good performance, considering the company’s financial capacity. The finding is 
consistent with Lee (2009) and Monem and Ng (2013) who argue for packages of remuneration 
for motivating executives and supporting positive company performance. 
The results display a positive relationship between the existence of corporate loans and financial 
distress likelihood. Corporate loans are significant at the 1 per cent level (p=0.009) and present a 
positive coefficient, indicating that companies with loans are more prone to financial distress; 
consistent with studies such as Rajan et al (2015) and Demiroglu and James (2015). The present 
study’s finding was expected since loans can incur high borrowing costs and increase default risk 
if companies have weaker capital structures. Boards and other corporate governance need to look 
at banks’ conditions before signing loan contracts that may be unsuitable for the company. 
Hypothesis 4 is therefore supported: corporate loans are positively related to financial distress and 
this is consistent with previous research (DeAngelo et al, 2011; Parlour and Winton, 2013). 
The CEOD variable is not significant within the model. It does not allow enough information to 
make further conclusions. The empirical result supports Rechner and Dalton’s (1989) empirical 
study in which no relationship was found between CEO duality and company performance or 
financial distress likelihood. 
In summary, the regression undertaken presents significant results supporting the impact of almost 
all the model’s variables. It is concluded financial and economic and corporate governance 
variables are critical when studying or predicting financial distress or bankruptcy. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper offers an approach to studying U.K. companies’ corporate governance characteristics 
and exploring how they can influence financial distress likelihood. It is evident that most corporate 
governance characteristics have an impact on financial distress likelihood. 
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The model used addresses financial and corporate governance factors guaranteeing the results’ 
quality. Variables examined to answer the main question set have been associated with financial 
distress by Altman (1968), Pindado et al (2008), Manzaneque et al (2016) and Lee (2009).  
The study indicates that the main corporate governance variables are significant when predicting 
financial distress. It is concluded that ownership concentration, independence, board size and 
director remuneration present a negative relationship with financial distress. The research confirms 
that companies may guarantee themselves a better performance with a large ownership 
concentration and independence, since large shareholders may have more interest and motivation 
for effective monitoring, and independent directors in companies appear to help in the mitigation 
of agency problems. Regarding board size, it appears that a large board performs better than a 
smaller one; believed to be due to the diversity of knowledge and resources a large board can bring 
to the company. Director remuneration results appears in line with agency theory: higher 
remuneration increases director motivation and company performance. 
We found a strong and positive relationship between corporate loans and financial distress. 
Companies financially distressed present a higher dependence on this type of loan but entail high 
costs some companies may not be able to pay. 
The model focused on corporate governance measures. It also showed that financial ratios have a 
strong influence on financial distress occurrence, in line with other studies. The model 
demonstrated a high relationship between financial distress and financial expenses and retained 
earnings.  
The research contributes to understanding how independence indicators, director remuneration and 
corporate loans contribute to financial distress likelihood. Companies should expect a decreasing 
likelihood of financial distress whilst there is: a high level of board independence; reduced 
corporate loans and consequently low risk of excessive debt; and directors are sufficiently well 
paid not to fall into incorrect and egoist decisions. These three variables play an important role in 
the U.K. market, but have apparently not been studied in the direct context of financial distress 
likelihood. This paper highlights and aggregates variables that have not otherwise been studied 
together. The empirical study has contributed to supporting the main ideas presented in the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2019). The study can be a useful tool to define corporate 
governance structure strategies.  
Existing companies, new companies and researchers could benefit from the findings, adopting new 
corporate governance structures and strategies to improve company performance. There are three 
main recommendations. Firstly, companies and boards should consider forming independent 
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boards where shareholders and directors are mainly independent. Secondly, companies should 
maintain a relatively high ownership concentration to guarantee shareholders have enough power 
to simplify and make decisions to run the business effectively. Thirdly, based on director 
remuneration and corporate loans: companies need to provide strong contracts packages to their 
directors, without compromising their financial wealth. Furthermore, companies should be aware 
of borrowing costs associated with corporate loans to ensure that they can afford the loan and pay 
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Table 1. Sample Selection 
  Number of 
Companies 
U.K. Listed Companies 1992 
Less:  
Financial Services and Insurance Companies  -688 
Inactive companies and without the latest accounts data available before 2018 -413 
Companies without total assets available in the period  -261 
Companies with other missing data -  43 
Companies not matched -317 
Total Sample   270 
Note: Our sample consists of 1,992 listed U.K. companies. SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) 
criteria were used to exclude Financial services and Insurances Companies (codes from 64 to 66). 
The final sample comprises 270 companies. The sample includes companies matched by highest 
total average assets. This study examines 270 companies based on one-year firm-observations. The 






























Table 2. Variables Description 
 
Variables Definitions ABRV 
Dependent Variable:   
Financial Distress 
 
Dummy Variable: It takes the value 1 if the 
company is considered financially distressed and 




   
Independent Variables:   
 




Financial expenses (Interest paid) divided by Total 
assets at the beginning of the period (FEt/RTAt-1) 
FE (+) 
Retained Earnings  Retained Profit or Losses divided by Total assets at 
the beginning of the period (REt/RTAt-1) 
RE (-) 
Company Age Number of years since the company’s incorporation AGE (-) 





Percentage of shares owned by large shareholders 
(shareholders who own more than 3 per cent are 
considered large shareholders) 
OWNERS (-) 
Independent Indicator 
‘BvD independence indicator’: degree of 
independence of a company in respect to its 
shareholders.4  
IND (-) 




Dummy Variable: taking the value 1 when the 
positions of Chairman and CEO are exercised by the 
same person, and the value 0 if the positions are 








Dummy Variable: it takes the value 1 when the 
company had a corporate loan in the year of analysis 





Note: The sign after each variable’s name represents its positive (+) or negative (-) relationship between 
the likelihood of financial distress, based on the assumptions and examination of the present research. 
 
4 Measured on a scale between 1 to 8, with 1 representing companies with direct shareholder ownership 
above 50% (high degree of ownership concentration) and 8 representing companies with more than 5 




Table 3. Sample distribution by industry    
 SIC Code 
 
Total Sample 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
N N N N N N N N N N % 
 1 5 9 5 8 7 6 8 4 6 58 21% 
 2 7 1 4 6 5 8 4 7 7 49 18% 
 3 2 1 3 3 3 5 3 2 1 23 9% 
 4 4 2 5 1 3 2 5 2 1 25 9% 
 5 4 3 1 1 5 5 1 2 7 29 11% 
 6 2 1 2 2 1 0 0 1 1 10 4% 
 7 4 6 8 1 0 1 4 6 6 36 13% 
 8 1 3 0 5 3 0 2 3 1 18 7% 
 9 1 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 0 22 8% 
Total 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 270 100% 
Note: Table 3 presents the frequency of the sample in each industry during the period of study (2010 to 2018). The industries presented were based on the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC): Mining and Quarrying (1), Manufacturing (2), Construction (3), Wholesale and Retail Trade, Vehicles and Motorcycles 
(4), Information and Communication (5), Real Estate Activities (6), Professional and Scientific and Technical Activities (7), Administrative and Support Service 
























Financial and Control Variables: 
FE 0.129 1.875 0.001 0.007 0.018 
RE -0.097 0.571 -0.147 -0.013 0.048 
AGE 30.900 27.335 14.000 19.000 34.000 
Corporate Governance Variables: 
OWNERS 28.634 26.168 7.000 21.550 43.710 
IND 6.833 1.968 5.000 8.000 8.000 
BS 7.163 2.426 6.000 7.000 9.000 
DR 2.036 3.365 0.457 0.857 2.127 
Note: Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample of 270 firm-observations. It summarises 
the mean, median, standard deviation, 25th percentile and 75th percentile for numeric variables. The 





Table 4.1. Sample descriptive statistics for categorical variables 
Categorical Variables Coded Count 
CEOD 
Coded 0 197 
Coded 1   73 
CL 
Coded 0   77 
Coded 1 193 
Note: Table 4.1 describes the dummy variables: CEO Duality and Corporate Loans. They 
are coded 1 in each case where the position of chairman and CEO are exercised by the same 





Table 5: Comparison of means between distressed and non-distressed companies       
 Non-Distressed Companies  Distressed Companies  














Financial and Control Variables:                 
FE 0.011 0.011 0.004 0.008 0.013 0.247 2.651 0.000 0.005 0.024 -1.037** 
RE 0.094 0.485 0.019 0.039 0.074 -0.288 0.588 -0.298 -0.135 -0.050 5.817*** 
AGE 38.015 31.473 15.000 23.000 54.000 23.785 20.186 14.000 16.000 25.000 4.422*** 
Corporate Governance Variables:                 
OWNERS 29.026 26.155 7.130 24.400 43.600 28.241 26.272 6.440 20.800 47.480 0.246 
IND 7.156 1.791 8.000 8.000 8.000 6.511 2.087 5.000 8.000 8.000 2.723*** 
BS 8.156 2.327 7.000 8.000 9.000 6.170 2.100 5.000 6.000 7.000 7.358 
DR 3.172 4.077 0.742 1.796 4.200 0.900 1.873 0.309 0.583 1.038 5.883*** 
Note: Table 5 presents a comparison of the means for economic and corporate governance variables between non-distressed and distressed companies. The Table shows a 
difference of means for the mean, median, standard deviation, 25th percentile, 75th percentile and the t-test for each variable. The sample consists of 270 firm-observations 
and the variables are presented in Table 2. *Significant at the 10 per cent level; **Significant at the 5 per cent level; ***Significant at the 1 per cent level 
 
 
Note: Table 5.1 presents categorical variables statistics for non-distressed and distressed companies and the Pearson's chi-square test to test the association with 
the Financial Distress variable. It is coded 1 in each case where the position of chairman and CEO are exercised by the same person or where companies do not 
have corporate loans. It is coded as 0 otherwise. ***Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
 
 
Table 5.1. Statistics for Categorical variables and Pearson's chi-square test       
  Non-Distressed Companies  Distressed Companies  
Chi- square 
Categorical Variables Coded Count % Count % 
CEOD 
Coded 0 103 76% 94 70% 
 1.521  
Coded 1 32 24% 41 30% 
CL 
Coded 0 24 18% 53 39% 
15.280*** 





Table 6. Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients        
 FD FE RE AGE OWNERS IND BS CEOD DR CL 
FD  -0.068 -.728** -.269** -0.020 -.193** -.423**  0.075 -.513** -.238** 
p-value   0.269 0.000 0.000  0.738 0.001 0.000  0.219 0.000 0.000 
FE 0.063  0.002 .133* -0.042 -0.059 .237** -0.034 .206** 0.590** 
p-value 0.301   0.973 0.029  0.491 0.335 0.000  0.583 0.001 0.000 
RE -.335** -.399**  .248**  0.007 0.060 .291** -0.112 .419** 0.133* 
p-value 0.000 0.000   0.000  0.909 0.327 0.000  0.065 0.000 0.029 
AGE -.261** -0.036 0.094  -0.098 0.028 0.138*  0.005 .243** 0.219** 
p-value 0.000 0.560 0.123    0.108 0.651 0.024  0.934 0.000 0.000 
OWNERS -0.015 -0.031 -0.015 -.130*  -.209** -0.106 -0.105 -.143* -0.059 
p-value 0.806 0.614 0.805 0.033   0.001 0.081  0.086 0.018 0.334 
IND -.164** -.182** 0.012 0.031 -0.276**  0.143* -0.125* .177** 0.016 
p-value 0.000 0.003 0.849 0.612  0.000   0.018  0.041 0.003 0.799 
BS -.410** 0.047 0.047 .195** -0.124* 0.103  -0.027 .633** 0.246** 
p-value 0.000 0.444 0.440 0.001  0.042 0.091    0.657 0.000 0.000 
CEOD 0.075 -0.038 0.001 -0.025 -0.074 -0.101 -0.013  -0.097 -0.003 
p-value 0.219 0.538 0.992 0.683  0.227 0.097 0.826   0.113 0.956 
DR -.338** -0.035 0.095 0.097 -0.214** 0.125* 0.510**  0.032  0.240** 
p-value 0.000 0.568 0.121 0.111  0.000 0.040 0.000  0.600   0.000 
CL -.238** 0.043 0.052 .204** -0.063 0.013 0.239** -0.003 0.143*  
p-value 0.000 0.485 0.398 0.001  0.305 0.829 0.000  0.956 0.019   
Note: Table 6 provides the Pearson correlation (below diagonal) and Spearman correlation (above diagonal) between all 
variables. The sample consists of 270 firm-observations and the variables are presented in Table 2. ** Correlation is 

























Table 7. Logistic Regression   
 β (S.E) Significance 
Financial Expenses (FE) 43.860 (14.108) *** 0.002 
Retained Earnings (RE) -14.060 (2.325) *** 0.000 
Company Age (AGE) -.014 (0.008) * 0.096 
Ownership Concentration (OWNERS) -.024 (.009) *** 0.004 
BvD Independence indicator (IND) -.286 (.115) ** 0.013 
Board Size (BS) -.225 (.113) ** 0.047 
CEO Duality (CEOD) .240 (.478) 0.615 
Director's Remuneration (DR) -.548 (.163) *** 0.001 
Corporate Loans (CL) 1.311 (.498) *** 0.009 
Constant 3.803 (1.223) 0.002 
Number of observations 270  
-2 Log likelihood 160.06  
Model Chi-square (Omnibus test) 214.239***  
Cox & Snell R Square 0.548  
Nagelkerke R Square 0.73  
Note: Table 7 shows the results of logistic regression. The regression used was a binomial logistic since the dependent 
variable (Financial Distress) is binary. The sample consists of 270 firm-observations and the variables are presented 

























Fig. 1. Financial Expenses. 
Above graph shows the financial Expenses of Non-Distressed and Distressed firms for the 2010-2018 period. 
Financial expenses are calculated as follows; Interest Paid divided by Total assets at the beginning of the period 








Fig. 2. Financial Expenses. 
Fig.2 illustrates the retained earnings of Non-Distressed and Distressed firms for the 2010-2018 period. Retained 
earnings are calculated as follows; Retained Profit or Losses divided by Total assets at the beginning of the period 
(REt/RTAt-1) as referenced in Table 2. 
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